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EVIDENCE-AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ERODED EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE-FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 608(b) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The illegal seizure of a size 38-40, medium tee shirt resulted in 
the conviction of Attorney J. Lee Havens for importing cocaine in 
violation of federal law.' The government, absent a warrant, confis­
cated the tee shirt in contravention of the fourth amendment's bar 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Consequently, the tee 
shirt was considered tainted evidence because it was procured by il­
legal police conduct.3 In United States v. Havens,4 however, the gov­
ernment was permitted to use the tee shirt, despite its tainted 
character, to impeach the accused. Havens evinced further erosion 
of the exclusionary rule of evidence. The exclusionary rule is an in­
strument used to protect the personal liberties guaranteed by the 
fourths and fifth6 amendments to the United States Constitution by 
barring the prosecution's use of evidence obtained through improper 
police conduct.' 
Since it first was enunciated,8 the exclusionary principle has 
been qualified to bar tainted evidence only from the prosecution's 
1. U~ted States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). Defendant also was convicted of 
conspiring to import cocaine and of knowingly and intentionally possessing a controlled 
substance. Id at 621. . 
2. The right of the people to be secure in their ~rsons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, Shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but u~n probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma­
tion, and particularly descnbing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to 6e seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). 
4. 446 U.S. 620 (1980). 
5. See note 2 supra. 
6. "[N]or shall any person. . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
8. Id at 392. 
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case-in-chief. The case-in-chief consists of the substantive proof 
presented to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence with respect 
to the crimes charged.9 The United States Supreme Court has per­
mitted the use of evidence to impeach a defendant-witness regarding 
matters collateral lO to the case-in-chief. Further, the Court permit­
ted the use of such tainted evidence to impeach the accused in mat­
ters directly related to, but still outside, the formal scope of the 
prosecution's case-in-chief.11 
A more recently created rule concerned with the exclusion of 
evidence is Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) (rule 608(b».l2 Rule 
608(b) is not addressed specifically to situations involving tainted ev­
idence. Rather, it addresses the exclusion of evidence concerning 
certain instances of a witness' prior conduct: By regarding a defend­
ant-witness' behavior in the fact paradigms surrounding the tainted 
evidence as a specific instance of conduct, cases otherwise invoking 
the exclusionary rule may come within the purview of rule 608(b). 
This note will briefly trace the history of the exclusionary rule, 
including the current judicial trend toward reducing the rule's scope. 
The mechanics of rule 608(b) will then be examined. This examina­
tion will be followed by an analysis of the overlap of the exclusion­
ary rule and rule 608(b). Finally, rule 608(b) will be evaluated as a 
method of excluding evidence that otherwise would be admissible 
due to the receding scope of the exclusionary rule. 
II. EROSION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the exclu­
sionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 13 in which it overturned a 
conviction for illegal use of the mails. The Court was very con­
cerned with the use of evidence obtained as a result of entry into 
Weeks' residence by police who then proceeded, in violation of the 
fourth amendment, to seize personal effects of defendant. 14 The 
Court determined that the trial judge had improperly allowed the 
prosecution to use these personal effects as evidence against defend­
9. The case-in-chief, also known as the direct case, is "[t]hat part of a trial in which 
the party with the initial burden of proof presents his evidence after which he rests." 
BLACK'S LAW DICflONARY 196 (5th ed. 1979). 
10. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); see notes 24 & 26 infra and ac­
companying text. 
11. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
12. FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see text accompanying note 43 infra. 
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
14. Id. at 386. 
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ant. IS The Court sought simultaneously to discourage police impro­
priety and to protect judicial integrity by barring the illegally 
obtained evidence. 16 In declaring the interrelation of these two con­
cerns the Court stated: 
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the coun­
try to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and en­
forced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting 
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights se­
cured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the 
judgments of the courts ....17 
The exclusionary rule was further strengthened in 1920 by 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 18 in which the Court 
barred the government's indirect use of illegally seized evidence. 
Documents were taken from petitioner's office pursuant to an invalid 
subpoena and subsequently were returned by order of the trial court. 
The government then sought to use the information it had obtained 
through the illegal seizure. 19 To do so, the Court reasoned, "reduces 
the Fourth Amendment to a form of words."20 Unless the evidence 
was obtained independently, it could "not be used at all" whether 
presented before the court or not.21" 
. Five years later, in Agnello v. United States,22 the Supreme 
Court barred the government from presenting cocaine illegally 
seized from defendant's house. The evidence was barred, not only 
from the government's case-in-chief, but also from the government's 
attempt to impeach defendant.23 
Although the exclusionary rule originally was used as an abso­
lute bar to admission of tainted evidence, as exemplified by Agnello, 
policy considerations have prompted exceptions to that rule. The 
primary reason for the exceptions is the Court's intent to prevent a 
defendant from shielding his perjury behind the government's disa­
bility to present tainted evidence. Based on this consideration, the 
Supreme Court, in Walder v. United States, 24 upheld the admission 
15. Id at 398. 
16. Id at 392. 
17. Id 
18. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
19. Id at 390-91. 
20. Id at 392. 
21. Id 
22. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
23. Id at 35. 
24. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
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of rebuttal testimony concerning illegally seized heroin.25 The Court 
reasoned that to prevent the government from rebutting Walder's 
sweeping denial on direct examination, that he dealt in or possessed 
any narCotics, would extend the Weeks doctrine to the point of per­
verting the fourth amendment.26 Thus, the door was opened for the 
prosecution's limited use of tainted evidence for impeachment pur­
poses in certain situations. . 
Statements made in the absence of Miranda warnings27 were 
used to impeach defendant in Harris v. New York.28 In contrast to 
Walder, in which defendant was impeached on collateral matters, 
Harris was impeached on matters included in his testimony on cross­
examination: matters which focused more directly on the crimes 
charged.29 Harris' conviction for selling heroin to undercover agents 
was upheld in the Court's further attempt to expose perjured testi­
mony of the accused.30 
Following Harris, it was a short step for the Supreme Court to 
permit illegally obtained evidence to impeach a defendant regarding 
matters directly related to the crimes charged yet not part of the 
prosecutor's case-in-chief. In Oregon v. Hass,31 defendant's state­
ments made subsequent to defective Mirando warnings were used to 
convict Hass of stealing a bicycle from a residential garage. Hass 
denied, on both direct and cross-examination, that he had known the 
location from which the bicycle was taken.32 As in Harris, the 
Supreme Court believed that" '[a]ssuming that the exclusionary rule 
has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deter­
rence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the 
prosecution in its case in chief.' "33 
Havens is the most recent decision in this line. The Supreme 
25. Id at 65. 
26. Id 
27. These warnings are derived from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
When the police take an individual into custody or otherwise deprive him of his freedom 
in a significant manner he is entitled to a warning prior to questioning. The warning 
must include notification and the individual must have actual knowledge that: 1) He has 
the right to remain silent; 2) anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; 
3) he has the right to the presence ofan attorney; and, 4) ifhe cannot afford an attorney, 
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning, should he so desire. Id at 467­
73. 
28. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
29. Id at 225. 
30. Id at 226. 
31. 420 U.S. 714 (1975). 
32. Id at 716-17. 
33. Id at 721 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225). 
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Court held that "a defendant's statements made in response to 
proper cross-examination ... are subject to otherwise proper im­
peachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been ille­
gally obtained that is inadmissible on the government's direct case, 
or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt."34 At the time of his 
arrest, Havens was carrying in his suitcase a tee shirt with holes cut 
out. The holes corresponded to swatches sewn onto a shirt worn by a 
coconspirator who previously had been arrested.3s The swatches 
served as makeshift pockets which contained cocaine smuggled into 
Miami International Airport from Lima, Peru. Havens was searched 
without a warrant and his tee shirt was confiscated.36 The evidence 
was subsequently suppressed pursuant to a motion prior to trial. 37 
The issue of the confiscation of the cut-out tee shirt was raised ini­
tially by the government on cross-examination.38 Havens there de­
nied knowing that the tee shirt was in his suitcase. The trial court 
permitted the prosecution to enter the tee shirt as evidence to rebut 
defendant's denial.39 
As a result of these recent decisions, the early development and 
strengthening of the exclusionary rule has been eclipsed by qualifica­
tions and exceptions. The rule no 16nger stands in absolute terms to 
protect a defendant at trial from the potential effect of tainted evi­
dence. As a more pandemic consequence, the effectiveness of the 
exclusionary rule as a countermeasure to police misconduct may be 
reduced, since improperly procured evidence can now be used 
against a defendant in limited circumstances. 
The United States Supreme Court is unlikely to retreat from its 
current interpretation restricting the use of the exclusionary rule.40 
Limiting the use of the rule, however, does not necessarily preclude 
the use of other rules of evidence to confront problems concerning 
tainted evidence.41 Rule 608(b) is one alternative method that can 
be employed to close some of the technical loopholes created by the 
current interpretations that limit the use of the exclusionary rule. 
Such loopholes inure to the benefit of law enforcement officials, the 
34. 446 U.S. at 627·28. 
35. Id at 621·22. 
36. Id at 622. 
37. Id 
38. Id at 622·23. 
39. Id at 623. 
40. See Kaplan, TIre Limits of lite Exclusionary RlIIe. 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 
(1974). See generally text accompanying notes 1·39 supra. 
41. See, e.g.. FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 404; FED. R. EVlD. 609. 
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very objects against whom the rule originally was designed to 
protect. 
III. RULE 608(b) AND THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
The Federal Rules of Evidence, which became effective in the 
Federal Courts on July 1, 1975,42 require that evidence of certain 
prior conduct of a witness be excluded from the trial. This principle 
of exclusion is embodied in rule 608(b).43 
Notwithstanding the use of evidence of prior convictions pursu­
ant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609,44 the first sentence of rule 
42. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 89 Stat. 805. 
43. (b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of conduct cf a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than 
conviction of cnme as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic 
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the wit­
ness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) con­
cerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to 
which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
44. FED. R. EVID. 609 provides: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a wit­
ness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted ifelicited 
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the pun­
ishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence ofa conviction under this rule is not admissible 
if a period ofmore than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or 
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of jus­
tice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence 
of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible 
unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice 
of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu­
nity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence 
of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been 
the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person con­
victed, and that person has not been cOnvicted of a subsequent crime which was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the convic­
tion has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure 
based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is gener­
ally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case 
allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if 
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an 
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608(b) enunciates a general rule prohibiting proof, by extrinsic evi­
dence, of specific instances of conduct for impeaching or supporting 
a witness' credibility. The second sentence immediately carves an 
exception to the general rule of exclusion. There have been signifi­
cant differences, however, in the interpretation of this exception by 
the circuit courts. In some cases, courts within the same jurisdiction 
have disagreed.45 
The prevailing interpretation46 of the exception recognizes an 
attorney's right to inquire of a witness, on cross-examination only, 
prior specific instances of conduct. The rule, under this view, stops 
short of allowing the cross-examiner the liberty of introducing ex­
trinsic evidence to rebut a witness' answer.47 In addition, the cross­
examiner is limited to an inquiry into the witness' general credibility. 
Though restricted, cross-examination is far from enervated. In prac­
tice, considerable prejudice and confusion may arise merely from the 
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair 
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. . . . 
Id 
45. Of the ten circuits that have interpreted the exception, the Fourth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Tenth have barred extrinsic evidence under rule 608(b), while the First and 
Second Circuits have admitted it. The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have demon­
strated confusion through inconsistent holdings. See cases cited notes 46 & 54 infra. 
46. 	 See, e.g., United States v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1980); United States 
v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), urI. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States 
v. Werbrouck, 589 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979); United 
States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.), urt. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); United 
States v. Turquitt, 557 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435 (9th 
Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 438 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, sub nom. United 
States v. Hendrix, 430 U.S. 937 (1977); United States v. Cluck, 544 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 
1976); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, sub nom. Clay 
v. United States, 430 U.S. 934 (1977); United States v. Estell, 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), 
cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); United States v. Blackshire, 538 F.2d 569 (4th Cir.), 
cerl. denied, sub nom. Barnes v. United States, 429 U.S. 840 (1976); United States v. Cox, 
536 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1976) (decided under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence); 
United States v. Wigoda, 521 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976); 
United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Simmons, 444 F. 
Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
47. United States v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1980); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & 
M. 	BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE' 608(05), at 608-22 (1981). 
Even those commentators normally supportive of a liberal reading of rule 608(b) 
would stop short of allowing extrinsic evidence to incriminate the criminal defendant. 
And where the accused has made assertions in his direct testimony which 
might be proved wrong by evidence of other misdeeds, hence impeaching the 
accused by contradiction, courts have held that the self-incrimination privilege 
does not shield him from inquiry into such matters, necessarily meaning that 
Rule 608(b) does not stand in the way either. 
3 D. LoUISELL & C. MEULLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 310 (1979) (footnote omitted) (em­
phasis added). 
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method of inquiry. "[T]he very question itself can convey the theo­
retically barred information to the jury. A skillful but unscrupulous 
cross-examiner can. . . ask the witness about incidents in his life in 
such detail ... as to render his denials completely suspect."48 
In United States v. Herman,49 representative of the majority 
view of rule 608(b), defendant, a former state court magistrate, was 
convicted of accepting bribes from a bail bonding firm..·This consti­
tuted violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza­
tions Act.SO After an unsuccessful attempt during its case-in-chiefto 
introduce a bail bond agency operator's testimony that defendant 
had accepted payments from him, the government tried to introduce 
this evidence in rebuttal.sl The trial court admitted the evidence for 
the limited purpose of rebutting the character evidence offered by 
defendant.S2 The court of appeals overturned the conviction and 
ruled that the rebuttal testimony was prohibited by the express pro­
visions of rule 608(b).S3 
A minorityS4 of circuit courts has eschewed a strict reading of 
the rule 608(b) limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence. These 
courts believe that restricting a cross-examiner to mere inquiry with­
out recourse to proof by extrinsic means is an improper manifesta­
tion of congressional intent. ss Implicit in this interpretation is the 
idea that the focus of the limitation within rule 608(b) is upon the 
scope of cross-examination. Since reliance upon extrinsic evidence is 
generally within the full scope of permissible cross-examination; 
under the minority interpretation, rule 608(b) does not act· to pre­
clude such evidence. S6 
The minority view is exemplified by the Third Circuit's opinion 
48. 3 1. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 47, at 608-26 (footnote omitted). 
"The possibility of abuse has led a minority of American jurisdictions to forbid all cross­
examination as to particular misconduct not the subject of convictions." Id. at 608-26; 
see id. at n.6. 
49. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). 
50. Id. at 1194. 
51. Id. at 1195. 
52. Id. at 1196. 
53. Id. 
54. E.g., Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Opager, 
589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 
513 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and mod!fted, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
859 (1978). 
55. United States v. Batts, 558 F.ld 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and modi­
fied, 573 F.ld 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978). 
56. See Advisory Comm. Note, Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). 
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in Carter v. Hewitt57 and the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States 
v. Opager.58 In Hewitt, plaintiff, an inmate at a state prison, charged 
that three prison guards had severely beaten' him during a routine 
search of his cell. 59 While being cross-examined, plaintiff was shown 
a letter that he had authored indicating that the allegations against 
the guards were part of a sham plot " 'to establish a pattern of bar­
baric brutal harassment ... .'''60 The letter, extrinisic evidence 
used for impeachment purposes, thus was entered into the trial 
record. 
The court of appeals in Opager reversed defendant's conviction 
for violating federal narcotics laws.61 A former coworker of defend­
ant testified that Opager had used and sold cocaine during the years 
they had worked together.62 The defense sought to impeach the 
state's witness by offering business records which demonstrated that 
Opager and the witness had not worked together during the period 
alleged by the prosecution.63 The court of appeals concluded that 
the district court erred in applying rule 608(b) to determine the ad­
missibility of the business records. 64 
Despite the general confusion with regard to the interpretation 
of rule 608(b),65 it is possible nevertheless to reconcile the divergent 
views when applying the rule specifically to the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence. To understand the operation of rule 608(b) in 
cases involving tainted evidence, however, it is necessary to examine 
the interplay between rule 608(b) and the exclusionary rule. 
IV. OVERLAP OF RULE 608(b) AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Rule 608(b) makes no reference to the exclusion of evidence 
tainted by illegal searches and seizures or violations of the Miranda 
rule. The Advisory Committee Notes66 and legislative history67 of 
57. 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980). 
58. 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979). 
59. 617 F.2d at 963. 
60. Id at 964-65. 
61. 589 F.2d at 806. 
62. Id at SOl. 
63. Id 
64. Id 
65. Compare Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980) with United States v. 
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1975); compare United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 
(5th Cir. 1979) wilh United States v. Henberg, 558 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 930 (1977); compare United States v. Batts, 55S F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn 
andmod!fted, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. S59 (1978) with United States 
v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1980). 
66. Advisory Comm. Note, FED. R. EVID. 6OS(b). 
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rule 608(b) similarly are silent with respect to the effects of improp­
erly obtained evidence.68 The absence of such cross-reference lends 
support to the notion that the application of rule 608(b), a creation of 
the legislature, was not intended to be preempted by the judicially 
created exclusionary doctrine. The two rules can operate indepen­
dently. The exclusionary rule specifically bars evidence subject to 
suppression for violations of the fourth amendment. Rule 608(b) fo­
cuses on the use of extrinsic evidence for specific instances of con­
duct relevant to a witness' veracity.69 Extrinsic evidence in the 
context of rule 608(b) entails proof by means outside the witness' 
own testimony. It is often in the form of testimony by a rebuttal 
witness or physical exhibits. 
The exclusionary rule applies specifically to criminal defend­
ants, while rule 608(b) does not expressly apply to defendants but 
rather, to witnesses in general. In addition, the law, both prior70 and 
subsequent71 to the effective date of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
has recognized that the mechanics involved when a criminal defend­
ant testifies are similar to those involving other types of witnesses. 
Thus, criminal defendants necessarily are included in this broad cat­
egory. The accused is obliged to speak truthfully and accurately 
when taking the stand and is subject to the normal character im­
peachment through cross-examination and rebuttal.72 A blanket 
principle which equates defendants with other witnesses, however, 
may be undesirable since, in many circumstances, "[t]here is a sub-· 
stantial danger that the jury will believe that the defendant is a bad 
67. For general legislative history of Federal Rules of Evidence, see Proposed Fed­
eral Rules ofEvidence: Hearings on H.R. .5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-27,374-76 (1974); Proposed Federal Rules ofEvidence: Hearings on 
H.R. .5463 Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure ofthe Comm. on 
the Judiciary 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-62 (1973) (Supp.) [hereinafter cited as House Sub­
committee Hearings); Proposed Federal Rules ofEvidence: Hearings on H.R. .5463 Before 
the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform ofFederal Criminal Laws ofthe Comm. on the Judiciary, 
93 Cong., 2d Sess. 1-11,91-99,312-23,387-88,517-44 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Special 
Subcommittee Hearings); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), re­
printed in (1974) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7098; H.R. REp. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. I (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7075; S. REp. No. 1277, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1(1974), reprintedin (1974) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7051; 120 
CONGo REc. 37075-84 (1974); id. at 1413-22, 2266-2377, HI2,253-59 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 
1974). 
68. See sources cited note 67 supra. But see House Subcommittee Hearings, supra 
note 61, at 46-48. 
69. See note 43 supra. 
70. United States V. Turquitt, 557 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1977). 
71. Oregon V. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975). 
72. United States V. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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man deserving of punishment even if he did not do the particular act 
charged."73 This danger is especially apparent in a case such as 
Walder, where defendant was indicted previously for similar 
offenses. 
A. Effect of Collateral Matters 
Although the focal points of the two rules vary, the operation of 
rule 608(b) may converge with that of the exclusionary rule in cer­
tain situations. The general exclusionary policy of rule 608(b) in 
avoiding unnecessary minitrials on collateral issues74 applies to in­
stances involving tainted evidence where such evidence is extrinsic 
and relates to specific misdeeds of a witness.75 Under either role, 
evidence identified as being both illegally obtained and extrinsic 
would be restricted from use in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 
The policy underlying rule 608(b) seeks to save the trial from 
being encumbered by matters only collaterally related to the issues 
being litigated.76 The term "collateral" in the context of rule 608(b) 
assumes a different sense than its use with respect to the exclusionary 
rule.77 A collateral matter under the exclusionary rule is one that is 
73. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 47, at 608-35. A pragmatic approach 
entails a 
rulling) in advance that the attacks on the defendant through bad acts will be 
limited in order to induce him to take the stand; to prevent his appearing in a 
false light compared to other witnesses, the court may ask that similar attacks 
be limited against the people's main witness. 
Id at 608-35-36. But see Special Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 61, at 316 (memo­
randum of G. Robert Blakely). 
74. Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 971 (3d Cir. 1980); 3 D. LoUISELL & C. MEUL­
LER, supra note 46, § 306. 
75. Few courts of appeals have considered cases dealing with the exclusionary rule 
in conjunction with rule 608(b). See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 
1250 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ken­
nedy, J., dissenting), withdrawn and modified, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cerro denied,439 
U.S. 859 (1978). 
Although the actual "misconduct" is perpetrated by the police in such circum­
stances, some improper conduct is implicated with respect to the witness. An illegal 
search and seizure, for example, may implicate the witness' possession of illicit narcotics. 
The "specific instance of conduct" here must necessarily focus upon the illicit possession 
rather than upon the illegal search and seizure itself. 
76. 3 D. LoUlSELL & C. MEULLER, supra note 46, § 306. 
77. Although under the exclusionary rule the United States Supreme Court has 
acknowledged a distinction between matters that are collateral and those that are directly 
related to the elements of a case, the effect has been the same for both. The Court in 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), and in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) . 
treated matters directly related to the case in a way similar to its treatment of collateral 
matters in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1925). But see 401 U.S. at 227 (Bren­
nan, J., dissenting). 
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outside the government's case-in-chief.78 Impeachment is the exclu­
sionary rule's primary form of collateral matter since it often occurs 
after the government rests its case-in-chief. Thus, impeachment may 
focus upon the substantive issues of the trial, as well as upon more 
tangential topics that are otherwise admissibl~. 
Under rule 608(b), however, an issue's collateral makeup is de­
termined, not by its relation to the case-in-chief, but rather by its 
importance, necessity, and probative value in relation to a witness' 
veracity or to the central issues of the case.79 This means that matter 
that is collateral but admissible under the exclusionary rule, may 
also be collateral under rule 608(b). Since the inverse of the relation­
ship is not necessarily true, the term "collateral" as used under rule 
608(b) is of narrower scope than under the exclusionary rule. It is 
conceivable that tainted evidence that otherwise may be admissible 
in the government's impeachment case under the exclusionary rule 
may be barred as being collateral to a particular witness' veracity or 
to the central issues in the case under rule 608(b). 
In Harris, the Supreme Court permitted the admission of ille­
gally obtained evidence for collateral purposes provided that the evi­
dence's trustworthiness satisfied legal standards.80 Determining 
satisfaction of legal standards in this sense could correspond pre­
cisely to the type of minitrial on collateral matter which the legisla­
ture sought to avoid with rule 608(b). Rule 608(b) requires merely a 
good faith standard to be imposed on the cross-examiner regarding 
the factual predicate of the alleged prior misconduct.81 The good 
faith requirement strongly indicates that adjudicating trustworthi­
ness of evidence is not within the purview of the rule. This may 
require, for example, testimony by the arresting police officers that 
statements made or acts done in the absence of proper Miranda 
warnings were not involuntary or the result of coercion.82 The result 
78. See generally United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 
420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 
347 U.S. 62 (1954); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Silverthorne Lumber 
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
79. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 47, at 608-24. 
80. 401 U.S. at 224. See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (citing 
Harris, 401 U.S. at 222). 
81. United States v. Bright, 588 F.2d 504, 511-12 (5th Cir.), cerro denied, sub nom. 
Whitten v. United States, 440 U.S. 972 (1979). Although Brigh' rests solely on rule 403, 
the considerations embodied in this rule are inherent in rule 608(b). See Advisory 
Comm. Note, FED. R. EVlD. 608(b). 
82. See 420 U.S. at 723; 401 U.S. at 224. 
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of focusing on an issue's collateral nature is to bar under rule 608(b) 
evidence that currently is admissible under the exclusionary rule. 
B. Dynamics ofDefendant's Denial 
An analysis of several of the cases that have interpreted rule 
608(b) indicates that some courts consider it of prime importance to 
discern the dynamics relating to a defendant's denial. It is this de­
nial which is the act that ultimately triggers rule 608(b), as well as 
the exclusionary principle.83 These dynamics call for scrutiny of the 
timing, method, and extent of the denial. Timing concerns whether 
the denial was made during the defendant's direct testimony or on 
cross-examination. The method of denial refers to whether the de­
fendant's statement was uttered voluntarily or elicited by the cross­
examiner. Extent of denial classifies the denial as either specific and 
clear or general and ambiguous. The following discussion analyzes 
the operation of this denial-dynamics approach. 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Batts,84 interpreted rule 
608(b) so that extrinsic evidence would be admissible to refute a de­
fendant's denial of prior misconduct when that evidence would cast 
his denial testimony in a "false light"8S before the jury. Batts' direct 
testimony included a general account of ~he events surrounding his 
arrest for importation of, and possession with intent to distribute, 
hashish.86 During cross-examination, Batts was asked a series of 
questions concerning a "coke spoon" he was wearing on a necklace 
at the time of his arrest.87 The questioning ultimately extracted a 
denial by Batts of any knowledge concerning the use of cocaine. The 
prosecution was aware that, seven months prior to his arrest in the 
instant action, defendant had sold cocaine to an undercover agent. 88 
Although evidence of the cocaine sale was suppressed,89 the prosecu­
tion successfully offered rebuttal testimony concerning Batts' prior 
83. See United States v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1980); Carter v. 
Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 971 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799,802 (5th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); 
United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and modtfted, 573 
F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978). 
84. 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn and mod!fted, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978). 
85. 558 F.2d at 517. 
86. Id at 515. 
87. Id at 516. 
88. Id 
89. Id The evidence was suppressed as a consequence of an illegal search and 
seizure and thus, the indictment was dismissed. 
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involvement with cocaine.90 
A major problem with the majority's opinion in Batts relates to 
the link between direct and cross-examination of defendant. The 
court was satisfied that it was "at least arguable that appellant [Batts] 
had opened up the subject area [of cocaine use) by testifying to other 
contemporaneous events at the port of entry."91 It is apparent, con­
trary to the court's perception, that the illegally seized evidence was 
related to a line of inquiry and a subsequent denial initiated by the 
prosecution on cross-examination. In no way was even a general de­
nial implicit in defendant's direct testimony. Batts condones the use 
of suppressed evidence as a specific instance of conduct predicated 
upon tenuous links between a defendant's direct testimony and his 
cross-examination.92 
In a more recent decision, the same circuit addressed a situation 
similar to that in Batts, although the extrinsic evidence in question 
was not subject to any prior suppression. In United States v. Bos­
90. Id 
91. Id The court then cited Banning v. United States, 130 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943), for the proposition that a cross-examiner has the 
right to fill in for the trial court all the details respecting matters brought out by direct 
examination. Batts, 558 F.2d at 516 n.6. It would be difficult under such broad rubric to 
prevent a talented cross-examiner from cleverly creating some opportunity for a linkage, 
thus developing a situation where admission of suppressed evidence would become 
commonplace. 
92. Bolts first considered that evidence relating to the "coke spoon" was received 
in evidence without objection prior to defendant's cross-examination. The court further 
stated that defendant's testimony concerning the coke spoon would, nevertheless, have 
been admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b). 558 F.2d at 516. This rule 
provides in part that "[t]he court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into 
additional matters as if on direct examination." FED. R. EVID. 61 I (b). 
Rule 608(b), although a rule into which cross-examination is interwoven, does not 
encompass the full panoply of power envisioned by the rulemakers in cross-examination. 
Cross-examination ordinarily must relate to matters exposed on direct examination. Id 
Under rule 608(b), this mere relevancy standard was ultimately replaced by a more limit­
ing standard requiring that the specific instances beprobative of veracity. Compare FED. 
R. EVID. 608(b) with Prelim. Draft (Mar. 31, 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161, 293 
(1969). In light of the legislative history of rule 608(b) and the Advisory Committee 
Notes, which appear to relate only to rule 61 I (a), the court in Batts erroneously extended 
itself on the matter of the scope of cross-examination under rule 608(b). See sources 
cited note 67 supra. 
Batts was subsequently withdrawn and another opinion substituted which predi­
cated the admission of the evidence on rule 404 and not on rule 608(b). United States v. 
Batts, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978). See also Comment, 
Evidence-Federal Rule ofEvidence 608(b)-Illegally Seized Extrinsic Evidence ofPrior 
Bad Acts ofJ)efendant Admissible for Impeachment When Exclusion Would J)efeat Pur­
pose ofAscertaining Truth. United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977), modified 
on rehearing, No. 76-2308 (Apr. 13, 1978), 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 375 (1978) (criticizing 
Batts). 
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ley,93 defendant was indicted for distribution of, and conspiracy to 
distribute, cocaine. In response to specific questions during cross­
examination, Bosley denied having delivered cocaine to anyone.94 
The circuit court reversed the trial judge's ruling that allowed the 
government to call a witness in rebuttal. In contrast to Batts, the 
government had a stronger case in Bosley since the denial was more 
closely related to matters exposed during defendant's direct testi­
mony.9S Nevertheless, extrinsic evidence was prohibited. Bosley 
noted that defendant's denial was specifically elicited by the govern­
ment and, therefore; within the rule 608(b) ban on extrinsic evi­
dence.96 It, however, left open the question whether a different 
result would have been reached had the denial been volunteered 
during direct testimony or as an unelicited statement on cross-exami­
nation. Underlying this question is the further inquiry: What con­
stitutes collateral matter under rule 608(b) since extrinsic evidence of 
such matter is barred by the rule? 
Prior misconduct not resulting in a criminal conviction may be 
considered collateral to the instant trial.97 Yet, a prior misdeed 
should attain a higher level of centrality to a case when a defendant 
raises the matter on his direct testimon~8 or volunteers it in response 
to cross-examination. The important element is that, in both in­
stances, the defense is putting the subject in issue. The goal of rule 
608(b) is to prevent unnecessary sidetracking on noncentral issues at 
trial. Once the sidetracking becomes necessary, as a consequence of 
the defense putting the subject at issue, the ban of rule 608(b) should 
be lifted since the matter inquired into becomes germaine to the 
litigation. 
Determining whether a matter has been raised by the defense 
should require more than merely "cracking open" the topic.99 The 
statement or denial should be clear and there should be a clear con­
tradiction between the defendant's pronouncements and what is 
93. 615 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1980). 
94. There was a question on appeal whether Bosley's denial referred to deliveries 
made at any time or merely during the course of the conspiracy. The court concluded the 
latter. Id at 1276-77. 
95. Prior to his cross-examination, Bosley stated that he was not involved in the 
alleged sale of drugs. Id at 1276. 
96. Id at 1277. 
97. United States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
930 (1977) (extrinsic evidence of prior civil fraud barred during cross-examjnation of 
defendant charged with use of mails to defraud). 
98. Id 
99. Id 
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sought to be proved by the proferred evidence. 100 Otherwise, there is 
a threat of trying the very issues sought to be avoided under rule 
608(b). 
A further illustration of the operation of the dynamics analysis 
can be drawn from United States v. Benedetto .101 This is a leading 
case from the Second Circuit, in which defendant had been con­
victed of illegally receiving money in connection with his official du­
ties as a government meat inspector. Four witnesses were produced 
by the defense to prove that no bribes ever were taken. The trial 
judge then permitted the prosecution to call a rebuttal witness to the 
stand. lo2 Although Benedetto is among the minority in permitting 
rebuttal by the use. of extrinsic evidence, the decision is consistent 
with an analysis of rule 608(b) that focuses upon the characteristics 
of a defendant's denial. Benedetto stated on direct examination that 
he had not accepted bribes.103 On cross-examination, he made a 
specific denial with regard to money offered by a particular individ­
ual. The court stated that, "[o]nce a witness (especially a defendant­
witness) testifies as to any specific fact on direct testimony, the trial 
judge has broad discretion to admit extrinsic evidence tending to 
contradict the specific statement, even if such statement concerns a 
collateral matter in the case."I04 The admission of extrinsic evi­
dence, therefore, was warranted since "Benedetto's statement was 
closely intertwined with the central issue of this case ... ."IOS 
Several courts, however, have barred extrinsic evidence of prior 
misconduct in spite of its potential probative value. I06 This result is 
more consistent with the plain language of rule 608(b). The notion 
that the examiner must ''take the witness' answer" does not limit the 
100. Cf Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980) (extrinsic evidence permitted 
where plaintiff inmate admitted writing letter indicating falsehood of claim of brutality 
committed by prison guards); United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848, 851 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(exclusion of suppressed evidence based on constitutional grounds), rev'd, 446 U.S. 620 
(1980). 
101. 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978). 
102. Id at 1248. 
103. Id 
104. Id at 1250 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954». 
105. Id Benedetto is unclear as to its reliance on rule 608(b). Although the issue 
in the case is squarely within the scope of the rule, the decision referred more to matters 
identified with reputation and opinion evidence under rule 608(a) than to specific in­
stances of conduct under rule 608(b). 571 F.2d at 1250 nn. 5 & 6. 
106. See note 40 JUpra; if. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, at 608-23­
24, 29-30 (inquiry into specific instances of conduct limited by FED. R. EVID. 403 consid­
erations to protect witness). 
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inquiry; but rather, it prevents the calling of other witnesses in 
rebuttal. 
The application of rule 608(b), which is predicated on the tim­
ing, method, and extent of a defendant's denial, can be employed to 
reexamine the cases involving suppressed evidence that were decided 
under the exclusionary rule. The results in Walder, Hass, and 
Agnello would remain unchanged, while those in Harris and Havens 
would be altered. In Walder, defendant voluntarily denied during 
direct examination any prior misconduct,107 as did defendant in 
Ross. lOS He further . reiterated his clear and complete denial on 
cross-examination. I09 In both cases, the evidence would be admissi­
ble. In Agnello, the evidence remained excluded since the denial, 
albeit a clear one, was elicited on cross-examination only. The col­
lateral issue was never raised by defendant's direct testimony.IIO 
The eliciting of less than clear denials in both Harris III and 
Ravens ll2 militates for excluding the suppressed evidence that ulti- . 
mately was admitted in each instance. Consequently, it seems clear 
that the analysis of rule 608(b) used by the circuit courts can be ap­
plied in certain instances to alter the effects of the exclusionary rule. 
C. Transactional Approach to Rule 608(b) 
An alternative to the technical analysis of rule 608(b), which 
. centers upon the intricacies of a defendant's denial, is a more general 
approach based on the factual transactions of a particular case. This 
latter application of rule 608(b) may be drawn from the language 
and prior history of the rule. 
Rule 608(b) uses the requirement of probative value as an ex­
plicit vehicle to determine an issue's collateral tenor. Earlier drafts 
of rule 608(b) also included a requirement that the matter inquired 
into by the cross-examiner not be "remote in time."1I3 A major rea­
son for carving this phrase out of the text was the fear of introducing 
. additional and unnecessary grounds for appeal. 114 Inclusion of the 
language might have diminished the preferred approach of trusting 
107. 347 U.S. at 63. 
108. 420 U.S. at 716-17. 
109. 347 U.S. at 64. 
110. 269 U.S. at 29, 35. 
111. 401 U.S. at 223. 
112. 446 U.S. at 622-23. 
113. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (Revised Draft March IS, 1971), reprinted in 51 F.R.D. 

315, 388-90 (1971). 

114. 117 CONGo he. 33642, 33645 (1971) (letter from Sen. lohn L. McClellan to 

Hon. Albert B. Maris (Aug. 12, 1971». 
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the "common sense, fairness and discretion"lIS of the trial judge. 
This history of rule 608(b), however, does not demand an automatic 
discarding of the remoteness criterion, especially if such considera­
tion is within the parameters of common sense, fairness, and discre­
tion. Remoteness may also be implicit in the process of balancing 
probative value against undue prejudice116 under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 (rule 403).117 
In certain circumstances, remoteness in time can be a compo­
nent of the trial judge's broad discretion in determining the proba­
tive value and collateral nature of specific instances of conduct. The 
remoteness component can be realized most effectively by using a 
transactional approach to the fact paradigms of each case. When the 
specific instance of conduct is part of the same transaction and oc­
currence that gave rise to the charges for which a defendant-witness 
is on trial, the court should be more amenable to admitting extrinsic 
evidence. While technically collateral, the matter in controversy 
may be closely related to the main issues in dispute. 1I8 
A transactional evaluation of the collateral nature of an issue 
provides a method for bridging the gap between the conflicting inter­
pretations of rule 608(b). Where prior misdeeds fall within the trans­
actional framework of the case, the minority rule119 controls. This 
means broader admissibility of extrinsic evidence. Prior misconduct, 
falling outside the transactional framework, is treated in accord with 
the majority viewpoint,120 which limits the use of extrinsic evidence. 
This analysis may also be applied to the cases decided under the 
exclusionary rule. The controversies surrounding the suppressed tee 
shirt in Havens and the statements made in violation of the Miranda 
warning in Harris and Hass materially bear upon the elements of the 
crimes charged. The collateral nature of these minitrials tends to 
abate when guilt or innocence pivots on a defendant's credibility. 
Incidents connected to the suppressed evidence in Walder were 
beyond the transactional frame of the facts that gave rise to the ar­
rests and indictments. Walder's prior indictment, later dismissed, 
bore no relation to his eventual trial other than the similarity of the 
crimes charged in both arrests.121 Agnello. is a more difficult case 
115. Id 
116. United States v. McClintic, 570 F.ld 685, 691 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978). 
117. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
118. See United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (ld Cir. 1978). 
119. See notes 54-64 supra and accompanying text. 
120. See notes 46-53 supra and accompanying text. 
121. 347 U.S. at 62-63. 
1981) EXCLUSIONARY RULE 151 
under this analysis since narcotics were seized from defendant's resi­
dence within a short time after he had transported the packages that 
allegedly contained narcotics.122 The acts, however, that were the 
basis of the arrests were completed before the police entered and 
searched Agnello's house. 123 Thus, the transactions and occurrences 
of the conspiracy were ended. Agnello did not deny that there was 
cocaine in the packages. He merely denied having any knowledge of 
the contents. His guilt or innocence did not pivot upon his credibil­
ity with respect to the existence of cocaine. Admission of the tran­
sactionally, collaterally tainted evidence rightfully was barred. 
A trial judge should be cognizant of the rule 403 balancing pro­
cess when faced with an offer of proof comprised of evidence subject 
to suppression. Admitting such evidence or exposing its existence 
could lead a jury to lend unwarranted credence to it at the risk of 
convicting someone for being a "bad person"124 based on prior mis­
deeds similar to those for which a defendant currently is on trial. 
Suppressed evidence necessarily implicates an arrest, from which a 
jury might wrongly infer guilt. The inference of guilt, which is not at 
issue under rule 608(b), may be more imposing where the accused's 
activities were suspicious enough to hue aroused the attention of the 
police rather than that of a mere private citizen who ultimately may 
testify against him. A jury might reflexively presume the correctness 
of a police officer's decision to place a suspect under arrest. 125 The 
jury, in addition, might be unduly influenced by suppressed physical 
evidence such as displays of narcotics or related paraphemalia. 126 
One pragmatic suggestion was offered by the Second Circuit in Bene­
122.. 269 U.S. at 28-29. 
123. Id at 31. 
124. C.f. 571 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1978) (danger of prejudice from evidence 
of other crimes generally, rather than from suppressed evidence in particular). 
125. A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, 178-80 (1979). 
Although law enforcement officials may not have as high a credibility rating as those in 
some white collar professions, they are perceived as being more truthful than many blue 
collar laborers. Id 
126. C.f. United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir.1975) (emphasizing 
"highly emotive" subjects such as narcotics use, "which carry with their very nature seri­
ous dangers of undue prejudice"). 
This situation often is avoided since the owner of illegally seized property may de­
mand its intmediate return. Physical evidence procured through an illegal search and 
seizure may be particularly influential since evidence may be "just as reliable as evidence 
obtained by legal means." Oaks, Studying 'he ExclUSionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 
37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 666 (1970). The evidentiary trustworthiness of a package of 
heroin is not impaired in the way a statement coerced in the absence of Miranda warn­
ings may be. In the former situation, the evidence can still speak for itself. See also Y. 
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 727 (4th ed. 1974). 
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detto: "[A]dmission of such strongly prejudicial evidence should 
normally await the conclusion of the defendant's case, since the 
court will then be in the best position to balance to probative worth 
of, and the Government's need for, such testimony against the 
prejudice to the defendant."127 This may aid in abating the potential 
for prejudice, but it far from vitiates the need for a rule 608(b) inter­
pretation that will be responsive to the problems of suppressed 
evidence. 
A transactional interpretation of rule 608(b) provides a worka­
ble method for diminishing prejudicial effects borne by tainted evi­
dence. Its application is consistent with both the legislative history 
and the policy behind the rule. Further, in the area of suppressed 
evidence, a transactional approach aids in bridging the gap between 
divergent interpretations of rule 608(b) as propounded by the circuit 
courts. 
v. CONCLUSION 
.~...... 
The exclusionary rule of evidence is a doctrine originally cre­
ated by the judiciary to protect the individual liberties granted by the 
fourth and fifth amendments. The specific goal of the doctrine has 
been two-fold: To protect society by discouraging errant police con­
duct and to uphold the integrity of the judicial system. 
A recent line of decisions by the United States Supreme Court 
has altered the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule by permitting 
limited use of improperly obtained evidence in the government's im­
peachment case. These decisions have rendered the exclusionary 
rule unable to perform as a functional deterrent of police misconduct 
and have reduced the rule's ability to promote judicial integrity. In 
addition, the rule is no longer an effective instrument to protect de­
fendants at trial from the prejudice of illegally obtained evidence. 
To solve the problems that resulted from the emasculation of 
the exclusionary rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) may be used 
as an effective alternative to bar the prosecution's use of illegally ob­
tained evidence. By defining a defendant-witness' participation in 
the events relating to the improper procurement of evidence as spe­
cific instances of his conduct, rule 608(b) can operate to overlay the 
exclusionary rule in the government's impeachment case. Gaps left 
by the exclusionary rule can thus be filled by rule 608(b) since each 
rule, though overlapping, applies independently of the other. 
127. United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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Rule 608(b) can act effectively to bar tainted evidence where a 
criminal defendant, as a result of solicitations by the cross-examiner, 
utters a putative denial that is general and ambiguous. Tainted evi­
dence would be prohibited as extrinsic provided that the defendant 
does not raise a specific issue relating to the evidence and that such 
issue is not germaine to the central issues in the case. This would 
include, therefore, instances wherein a defendant voluntarily denies 
a particular allegation either during his direct testimony or as an 
unelicited statement on cross-examination. Concentrating on the dy­
namics of a defendant's denial thus provides a method of applying 
rule 608(b) consistent with the rule's primary objective to avoid un­
warranted minitrials on tangential issues. 
An alternative analysis of rule 608(b) that similarly can act to 
alter the effects of the exclusionary rule focuses on the transactional 
nature of a particular case. This approach can be used to determine 
an issue's collateral nature and, consequently, whether extrinsic evi­
dence must be barred. If the incidents rela~g to the illegal seizure 
of evidence lie outside the factual fram~work of the central issues in 
the case, such illegal evidence must be barred as extrinsic under rule 
608(b). This application is consistent with the majority interpreta­
tion of rule 608(b). The minority view would prevail, however, 
when prior misdeeds fall within the framework of transactions and 
occurrences that give rise to the charges for which a defendant-wit­
ness stands trial. 
The transactional theory finds its basis in the requirement of 
elementary fairness and discretion by the trial judge with respect to 
the probative value of proferred evidence. Implicit in the require­
ments of discretion and probative value, by which rule 608(b) meas­
ures an issue's collateral nature, is the remoteness criterion. This 
element, removed from the rule by the drafters for technical reasons, 
precludes inquiry by the cross-examiner if the subject matter is re­
mote in time from the central issues at bar. The Jransactional ap­
proach is an equitable method of employing the remoteness factor 
since it, in tum, is grounded in the court's discretion and sense of 
fairness. 
When applying transactional theory of analysis to the cases de­
cided under the exclusionary rule, it is important to consider whether 
the illegal evidence in question is related materially to the elements 
of the crimes charged. Ifsuch a material relationship exists, the pro­
hibition against using the illegal evidence should become less oner­
ous. In this situation, the threat of lapsing into unwanted minitrials 
would be minimal. 
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The use of evidence subject to suppression often raises the spec­
tre of prejudice. A transactional theory operates to reduce such 
prejudice. This approach, in addition, is consistent with the policy 
behind rule 608(b), as well as with the divergent applications of the 
rule by the circuit courts. 
Whether applying rule 608(b) under a denial-dynamics ap­
proach or a transactional approach, the rule can operate as an effec­
tive response to some of the problems caused by illegally obtained 
evidence. 
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